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‘The time to work for a commonwealth of civilizations is now.’ 
(Giovanni Arrighi et al. 1996) 
 
A Short History of Cultural Studies (Hartley 2003) made the claim that cultural studies is a 
‘philosophy of plenty’; a way of understanding the creation of cultural values among large 
populations, in times of economic growth, democratisation and consumerism. However these same 
times – the ‘long twentieth century’ (Arrighi 1994; Brewer 2004) – were marked by unprecedented 
social and ideological upheaval, with imperialism, total war, totalitarianism, and ‘mutually assured 
destruction’ (Cold War) as the dark side of progressive secular scientific modernity. Over that long 
century from the 1880s, world economic and political leadership shifted from European hegemony 
and British free-trade imperialism to US entrepreneurial-managerial capitalism. The end of the ‘long’ 
century was marked by further change, often gathered under the term ‘globalisation.’ For their part, 
the human, political and economic sciences underwent what has been called the ‘cultural turn,’ 
associated with post-industrial or network society, the ‘new’ or knowledge economy, postmodernism 
… and cultural studies. 
Brainchildren of the West 
There is no doubt that cultural studies is a Western intellectual enterprise, born out of and seeking to 
shape specifically Atlantic tensions as economic, political and cultural experience adjusted to 
American hegemony, carried around the world as much on the wings of popular culture as by 
military and economic power; i.e. by Hollywood, rock & roll, television; everything except sport 
(whose globalised forms, soccer and the Olympics, are European in origin). Interestingly it was not 
during the 1930s to 1950s, the period when American supremacy was established in fact, but later, 
when it was first seriously challenged – in Vietnam – that cultural studies came to prominence. In the 
1960s and early 70s, popular culture in Europe began to turn the tables on the semiotic superpower 
by exporting its own music back to it, in the process changing its provenance from black blues to 
white pop, from authentic expression of oppressed identity to international chart-topping 
entertainment, albeit through the medium of working-class creative angst and aspiration, embodied 
in stars like John Lennon of the Beatles and later in the punk explosion associated with the Sex 
Pistols. Even more remarkable was that musicians began to function as the intellectual leadership of a 
new generation. It was through commercial music and pop culture that ‘countercultural’ politics 
circulated, not through the traditional technologies of democracy and party machines, although the 
two did collide in noisy ways, notably in the iconic year of 1968 (Gitlin 1993), when Martin Luther 
King and Robert Kennedy were assassinated as the civil rights movement gained strength, the 
‘evenements’ of May set Paris alight, the Democratic Party convention in Chicago dissolved into 
violence as anti-war activists were attacked by police, students were gunned down in Mexico City, a 
massive demonstration against the Vietnam War radicalised ‘swinging’ London (Halloran et al 1970), 
the Prague Spring came and went in Czechoslovakia … and youth culture turned from dancing to 
demonstrations.  
 
The music-and-drug culture of ‘peace and love,’ the hippie ethic of flower-power, and the ‘politics of 
the personal’ arising from feminism and civil rights, merged in ‘new social movements’ dedicated to 
the expansion of the mind and to the liberation of women, people of colour, sexual orientation, the 
Third World, the environment, even children (The Little Red Schoolbook; Hansen & Jensen 1971) – 
in short the emancipation of culture and identity. These movements were not readily assimilated into 
the existing labour movement or representative politics, although they did intersect around nuclear 
disarmament and anti-war activism. Instead they began to create their own media and their own 
organised forms on cultural sites, which were often also commercial enterprises – record labels (the 
Beatles’ Apple), concerts (Woodstock), the ‘underground’ press, art ‘happenings,’ participatory forms 
of democracy and a political sensibility formed in festivals (culture) rather than in the factory 
(economy) or forum (politics).  
 
All of these were Western developments, although countercultural activists were attracted to various 
revolutionaries from Che Guevara to Mao Zedong, whose works enjoyed a brief vogue among New 
Left intellectuals, along with those of liberationist thinkers from the Third World such as Frantz 
Fanon and Julius Nyerere. The question now is whether the passions of the ‘baby-boomer’ generation 
created an intellectual system that would outlive their own circumstances; and whether a movement 
that was essentially internal to the West, struggling against the dominant tendencies of its own social 
formation, holds any lessons for those beyond that context. To put it bluntly, why should, and how 
can, the career of cultural studies interest non-Western countries like China or young people today?  
 
If history is any guide, there is not much to be gained by seeking to ‘apply’ Western ideas directly, 
even those regarded as positive:  
The claim that Western civilization is the bearer of a heritage of liberalism, 
constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free 
markets, and other similarly attractive ideals … rings false to anyone familiar with the 
Western record in Asia in the so-called age of nation-states. In this long list of ideals, it is 
hard to find a single one that was not denied in part or full by the leading Western 
powers of the epoch in their dealings either with the peoples they subjected to direct 
colonial rule [India; Indonesia] or with the governments over which they sought to 
establish suzerainty [China]. And conversely, it is just as hard to find a single one of 
those ideals that was not upheld by movements of national liberation in their struggle 
against the Western powers. In upholding these ideals, however, non-Western peoples 
and governments invariably combined them with ideals derived from their own 
civilizations in those spheres in which they had little to learn from the West. (Arrighi et 
al 1996) 
 
In other words, intellectual movements whose origins lie in the West, even those regarded as 
emancipationist, may be merely a colonising ruse to power if they are imported to the global-South 
or to the East as part of an attempt to convert the locals. They will only be of value if they are 
propagated as part of a conversation in which both parties have a speaking role. Thus, ‘applying’ 
cultural studies directly to current circumstances is simply not going to work. Instead, what is needed 
is an understanding of what is at stake in the issues, combined with a vigorous effort to investigate 
the specificities of the new situation from within its own context. In the Chinese case this means 
avoiding both extremes of ‘catch-up’ (blind borrowing) and ‘get-out’ – the exceptionalist alibi, as in 
the oft-used phrase ‘so-and-so … with Chinese characteristics’ (which turns the thing named on its 
head). Like other Western ideas, those associated with cultural studies, and more to the point with 
the problems it has sought to analyse, have assumed global significance in recent years. However 
China’s own complex history, culture and specific circumstances will necessarily reorder this 
‘problem situation.’ In short cultural studies is not a method to be applied like a cookie-cutter to all 
circumstances.   
 
What then is at stake in cultural studies, and how might Chinese and other contemporary readers and 
researchers make use of its insights for their own forward strategies? Can it be ‘abstracted’ from its 
original context and remain useful? Or is it merely a passing trend – less a framework of explanation 
than a symptom of the times requiring explanation? Such a reflexive question about its own 
explanatory power is in fact one of the more enduring characteristics of cultural studies; one of its 
most important moves. Here is a mode of intellectual inquiry that insists on what is called 
‘conjunctural’ (context-specific) analysis rather than ‘scientific’ universalism, where a ‘problem 
situation’ (or ‘problematic’) requires its own ‘conceptual framework.’ 
 
Cultural studies and social change 
Cultural studies was born out of an attempt to understand social change. More to point, it was an 
intellectual attempt to show how to provoke social change in certain areas while resisting it in others. 
In the country and the period in which I grew up, Britain in the 1950s, it seemed to some on the Left 
that, in the place where the Industrial Revolution had begun, decades of activism in the economic 
sphere (trades unions and the mass labour movement) and in the political sphere (the Labour Party) 
had not resulted in decisive social change (‘revolution’) in favour of working-class or progressive 
interests. However, the Left was also scarred by the events of 1956 in Suez and Hungary, when both 
Western social democracy and Soviet socialism, in their international guise, were revealed as 
militaristic coercive forces without emancipationist hope for the locals. Marxism, the favoured 
‘conceptual framework’ for explaining social change, was compromised. Meanwhile, after the home-
front egalitarianism of World War II and a short period of state-socialistic nationalisation afterwards 
(the Labour government of 1945-51), the British working class persistently voted for conservative 
governments, who presided over a consumer boom, improved housing and employment, and 
decolonisation too. Some on the New Left thought to ask why, if ordinary people’s interests were 
‘objectively’ in line with those of the labour movement, they valued listening to pop music 
(subcultures) over voting Labour.  
 
Given ‘apathy’ at home and ‘atrocity’ abroad, it was no wonder that new sources for progressive social 
change were sought. Cultural studies has been an extended response to this impasse. The response 
was both negative and positive. Negatively, those who turned to culture wanted to know if cultural 
factors were responsible for stopping what had been predicted as inevitable historical change, driven 
by economic and political determinations. Was there something about culture – in particular the 
workings of ideology – that needed to be better understood? Positively, it was quite obvious by the 
1960s that burgeoning youth culture, subcultures, alternative and countercultures were beginning to 
provoke social change through culture – in music, performance, film, writing and other arts, which 
were much more successful at popularising a message or mobilising a community of action than 
anything being done by traditional political parties or workplace agitators (combined). Many on the 
Left were attracted to the possibilities opened up by these developments, despite the commercial 
environment in which popular culture thrived. Here, commercial enterprise seemed expansive and 
communicative, linking a ‘we’ community. It did not fit the stereotype of an exploitative and 
manipulative ‘they,’ to which leftist thinking traditionally consigned corporate values. 
 
These things have left their mark on cultural studies to this day. The kernel of the question that 
remains from this conjuncture is this: what have culture, individual identity, and the pursuit of 
values associated with consumption, leisure and entertainment, got to do with social change? A 
corollary question is: if culture (as well as economics and politics) is implicated in social change, can 
it be construed as progressive (self-realisation; the emancipation of the ordinary) as well as regressive 
(ideological manipulation by media and corporate interests)? And a third question is: how can the 
intellectual tools necessary to explain a given situation be understood as part of the object of study; or 
to put it another way, how can social change be understood by its own agents? These questions would 
translate well to the Chinese and contemporary context. 
 
Furthermore, if it is going to turn out as predicted that China will be the ‘hub’ around which the next 
‘long century’ is going to emerge into whatever new order is eventually established, then the 
analytical project of cultural studies has something to offer contemporary inquiry into social change. 
Its long attention to the ‘strategic’ relations among economic growth/ascendancy, political 
leadership/democratisation, and cultural experience/identity is worth following. For cultural studies 
is a very good place to think about how responses to shifts in power are experienced, how individual 
agency is amplified or stymied by global systems, how creative values merge or conflict with 
economic ones, and how the ‘performance of the self’ may enable or inhibit political change. As its 
own economic system matures, China is building a (demand-led) consumer and services market on 
top of the (supply-led) low-cost manufacturing base established in the first decades of its opening up. 
To sustain economic growth, sophisticated, productive, creative agents – both producers and 
consumers – are increasingly required. This inevitably impacts on political arrangements. Growth 
and development require individual agency; meanwhile the dynamism of the system requires 
spontaneous order (market) rather than central control (decree); and self-realisation for myriad 
individuals can occur in conditions that include markets, entertainments and social networks as well 
as more traditional political forms. Cultural studies is an aid to new thought in this area. It was 
sparked into life in the first place by an urgent need to understand social change at a moment when 
existing paradigms of knowledge, both scientific and political, were in crisis, and when the drivers of 
change seemed to be migrating from the economic and political spheres to the cultural. The need to 
understand the role of culture in social change remains in a globalised world where strategic 
economic and political power is shifting from West to East. 
 
Creative destruction 
Cultural studies has been a disruptive intellectual force in the West. This too may hold lessons for 
China, one of which is that disruptive innovations often provoke quite negative reactions until their 
widespread adoption and retention neutralises the ‘shock of the new’ (in Robert Hughes’s famous 
phrase). This certainly has been true for cultural studies as an intellectual enterprise. It has attracted 
plenty of heat for its tendency to blurt out something about knowledge in general that scientific and 
policy discourses have tended to ignore or even keep a ‘secret’ (Birchall 2006). The ‘secret’ at the 
heart of knowledge is that all knowledge faces a crisis of legitimacy, because the legitimacy of 
knowledge cannot be decided in advance. The authority of the author (the expert witness), the 
adequacy of the method (science), even the apparent obviousness of observation (common sense) – all 
of these are seen by cultural studies in its ‘postmodern’ mode as emanating from language, not reality 
– they are ‘constructs,’ pretexts, ruses to power, or fictions. Cultural studies has attracted sustained 
derision from scientists (Sokal 2000), from outraged empiricists (it is ‘educationally corrupting and 
professionally embarrassing’: Windschuttle 2000) – and from those who wish to believe in the truth 
of the bleeding obvious (journalists).  
 
But, after the heat subsides, it can be seen that this was merely what medical practitioners call 
referred pain. The cause of the problem was not in cultural studies but in modern knowledge itself. 
Knowledge is now the very engine of economic growth, public policy, business practice and the 
informed citizen, not to mention the sophisticated consumer, in a ‘knowledge economy,’ ‘information 
society’ and ‘media culture.’ Because of its central importance to all kinds of productivity – economic, 
political and cultural – knowledge plainly needs to be trusted. Equally plainly, it is not trustworthy. 
Successive crises of legitimacy rock the world, from the question of whether ‘big science’ is safe 
(Chernobyl, Bhopal; GM foods; bioscience) and tells the truth (climate change), whether or not a 
country has weapons of mass destruction (Iraq, Iran), whether politicians (Independent 2006), 
journalists (Danwei 2007) and authors (Age 2004) fake their stories, to little local embarrassments for 
cultural studies itself, notably the Sokal hoax (Sokal 2000).  
 
Cultural studies has a predilection for ‘deconstructive’ readings of realist ‘texts,’ not just in the safe 
playpen of literary fiction but more riskily in the most exposed promontories of the real – i.e. science 
and politics. Small wonder that those with a stake in truth express exasperation when it is 
undermined. Either it is hopelessly compromised by the uncertainty underlying all knowledge, or it 
is hopelessly pluralised, becoming a property not of things but of experience; for example when 
people with religious convictions acknowledge both scientific and divine truths, despite their evident 
incommensurability. From there it may seem hard to resist a slide to subjectivism where truth means 
whatever anyone likes, as in TV comedian Stephen Colbert’s brilliant concept of ‘truthiness’ (see 
scientificblogging 2008). Despite the protests of those who like their truth to be ‘analogue’ and 
straightforward, it can only ever be contingent, mediated and contested. The critics have a tendency 
to blame the messenger – accusing cultural studies of holding the views it uncovers in texts. They are 
made even more irritable because cultural studies is often practiced at the margins of respectable 
knowledge, in mass teaching colleges rather than prestigious science departments, or in ‘unworthy’ 
subject areas like media, gender, or literary studies, rather than in medical schools. In short, cultural 
studies is seen as a pain in the neck, foisted on unsuspecting undergraduates by postmodern theorists 
in second-rate colleges.  
 
However it is just these symptoms of disruption at the margins that have led one observer, Richard E 
Lee (2003), to claim that cultural studies is part of a much larger crisis of legitimacy of knowledge; 
one in which it plays the same role for the social sciences and humanities that complexity studies 
have done for the sciences ‘proper’ (Lee 2004). Together, argues Lee, cultural studies and complexity 
studies mark ‘a shift away from emphasizing equilibrium and certainty,’ where causality is defined as 
‘the consistent association of antecedent conditions and subsequent events amenable to experimental 
replication and hypothesis testing’ (Lee 2004). In other words, both cultural and complexity studies 
have acted as agents of ‘creative destruction’ (in Joseph Schumpeter’s famous phrase) of the modernist 
paradigm of knowledge, in the natural and social sciences respectively. This is provoking a reordering 
of the field of knowledge as a whole, in which positivist value-free science and value-laden but 
economically neutral culture are alike disrupted. Both science and culture have been thrown from 
Newtonian equilibrium and reinserted into the ‘arrow-of-time’ of irreversible historical change, 
which in turn requires attention both to historical contingency and to personal positionality. Lee 
writes: 
During the period from the late 1960s, the ‘new sciences’, emphasizing complexity, 
irreversibility, and self-organization, have effectively abdicated a role of guarantor of 
truth in knowledge and reintroduced the arrow-of-time into the natural sciences. The 
world of nature, like the human world, has now been shown to bring order out of chaos 
– it is creative; the future is an open future (rather than a predictable Newtonian one), 
determined only by creative choices and contingent circumstances at unstable moments 
of transition. This has the effect of freeing knowledge production from the aporia of 
uncovering infinite disconnected particulars in search of impossible universals. In a 
world recognized as creative in all its aspects, values and knowledge, Wert [meaning and 
values] and Wissen [systematic knowledge of reality], are necessarily fused. (Lee 1997) 
 
These far-reaching consequences of early cultural studies were not immediately evident to observers 
(although they may have been aspired to by some of those involved); but from those small and simple 
beginnings, seeking to understand how cultural pursuits might trump socio-economic structures, 
something of system-wide significance is still propagating, across disciplines, institutions, and 
problematics.  
 
Excess of representation; representation of excess 
Along the way, cultural studies was caught up in a crisis not so much of knowledge as of 
representation, which was also entering the period of ‘creative destruction’ known as postmodernism. 
Here the legitimacy of both political and semiotic representation, as inherited from nineteenth 
century philosophy, was challenged. Commentators became interested in the productivity of signs, 
and in particular the excess of mediation in contemporary societies, whereby signs – often entirely 
detached from any plausible referent – suffused the public and private domains. Although they were 
often criticised for turning the world into a text, the postmodernists were among the first to see 
clearly, right across the domains of politics, culture and the economy, that representation had been 
emancipated from reality, and that the process of abstracting textuality, signification, meaning and 
value from situated context or referential causation was a phenomenon of the system, not of their 
own fantasies. Everywhere, signs were proliferating; referents retreating. Excessive media 
signification, in movies, advertisements, TV and the arts, was only the most visible form. Easily 
observed and readily taught, media studies ‘caught’ postmodernism early and popularised it widely, to 
the dismay of the nineteenth-century disciplines.  
 
However, abstraction and the detachment of the sign characterised even economics, where capital 
itself was ‘textualised’ in the form of financial markets, releasing unprecedented energy into the 
global financial system. Work was abstracted from the labourer in automated factory systems. The 
wide distribution of personal computers detached words from pages, allowing ‘text’ to become mobile 
in ways that would have astonished typewriter-bashing journalists of the modern era, but they too 
were busy textualising the world in order to know it. Recipes were abstracted from food, allowing 
celebrity chefs to prosper even as cooking declined as a social practice. In short, ‘the economy’ shifted 
decisively from manufacturing to information. Politics shifted from representative to mediated forms, 
in which class, party or ethno-territorial loyalty gave way to a system where politicians auctioned 
promises for votes and events mattered in direct proportion to their visibility on network TV. Culture 
became the site for the tensions, struggles and ‘affordances’ associated with these changes to be 
worked through at the local, contextual and experiential levels.  
 
In such circumstances, which were fully operational in the West just as China began its opening up 
process, the most pressing needs were the problems of plenty – how to manage information overload, 
semiotic excess, an affluence of the mind that was rapidly extending to whole populations the 
resources of knowledge hitherto enjoyed only by expert specialists and rich elites. Productivity 
migrated from ‘producers’ to ‘consumers.’ The better business plan henceforth was not the one 
devoted to origination and unique creative invention but the one dedicated to information and 
knowledge sharing and management – the search engine, the editor, the filter, the synthesiser.  
 
This was part of a more profound shift, where the modernist paradigm of realist representation as a 
whole was transforming. Excess of representation (postmodernism) was but a symptom of a general 
shift of productivity (semiotic and economic) further along the ‘value chain of meaning’ (Hartley 
2008a). Productivity is manifested in the assumed source of meaning in any system, and this general 
shift can be observed across many domains and processes (see Fig. 1). 
Fig. 1: The value chain of meanings [reproduced from Hartley 2008a, p. 28] 
ERA:   PREMODERN   MODERN    GLOBAL____________ 
 
Value chain… 
… of merchandise origination/production  commodity/distribution consumption/use  
… of meaning  author/producer  text/performance  reader/audience 
 
When, where, who (time, place, population) 
When   medieval   modern   postmodern 
Where   church    public sphere   private life 
Who (population) the faithful   the public   DIY citizen  
Who (intermediary) priest    publisher   marcom/IMC   
 
How (regime) 
Theorist  Bible    Marx    Foucault 
Subjectivity  soul    individual(ism)   experience 
Power-base              pain of death/hell  war    administration of life 
                                   (“market”) 
Sovereign  monarch/divinity  nation state   self 
Arms-bearer  knight/crusader  conscript/volunteer  terrorist 
Enemy   peer/heretic   country   civilian 
State   ‘Hobbesian’   ‘Machiavellian’   ‘Kantian’ 
 
Why (knowledge) 
Philosophy  revelation    scarcity   plenty 
Epistemology  theology   empiricism   plebiscite 
Educational reach elite    mass    universal 
 
What (form)
Interpretive form exegesis   criticism   redaction 
Creative form   ritual/liturgy   realism (journalism, novel) reality 
 
What for (communicative politics) 
Mode of literacy hear only   read only   read and write 
Mode of address convert   convince (campaign)  converse 
 
Who says (choice control) 
Source of control ‘Him’ – divine control  ‘Them’ – expert control ‘Me’ – self control 
Source of choices no choices   publisher/provider  navigator/aggregator 
 
   = Fundamentalism  = Modernism   = Globalization 
  
 
 
 
 
 
From DIY to DIWO  
(Do-It-Yourself to Do-It-With-Others)  
Postmodernism was the philosophy of representational excess, but it proved to be a mere symptom, 
because representational productivity was soon overtaken by a more direct kind, in which consumers 
began to be producers themselves. This expansion of productivity was closely associated with, and 
most visible in, the growth of Web 2.0 social networks and DIY applications, although the shift from 
closed expert system to open innovation network can be observed much more generally. While these 
developments were clearly American in origin and tone – they were individualistic, entrepreneurial, 
technological and expansionist – their impact was global as the internet followed financial capital and 
business practices on to the world stage. The consumption of signs, in the form of mass media 
entertainment supplied by giant corporations, which had been international if not globalised for 
many decades, began to feel the heat of competition from myriad locally-originated user-led 
innovation (e.g. open source), consumer co-creation (OECD 2007), and DIY culture (see Hartley 
1999: 179-81). 
 
These changes posed a challenge to cultural studies as it had become widely institutionalised, because 
by this time it had developed a reasonably stable set of concerns about ideology and cultural struggle, 
the politics of the personal, the indeterminacy of knowledge, and a toolbox of methods for 
demystifying ‘dominant’ cultural forms and practices. In other words cultural studies was kitted out 
to deal with the representational productivity of an essentially industrial system. Now, it is faced 
with a new kind of productivity – that of the open network, in which individual agency is creative, 
not an effect of power or causal determination from somewhere else (like ‘corporate capitalism’). 
Even system-wide innovations might be seen as ‘bottom-up’ rather than ‘top-down’ phenomena, such 
as ‘crowd-sourcing,’ the blogosphere, social networks, and the reordering of knowledge via 
‘folksonomy.’ The distinctions between expert and amateur, producer and consumer, power and 
subjectivity have all been thrown into crisis.  
 
The challenge in these developments is to resist using a cookie-cutter version of cultural studies (as 
‘critique’) to reduce them to a known framework of analysis before exploring the potential of new 
forms of productivity based on individual agency, technological affordances, global 
interconnectedness, and rapid social change. For instance a certain branch of ‘critique’ (see Lovink 
2008) has fixed on cultural labour in order to argue that user-led innovation and consumer co-
creation are little more than a further step in capitalist exploitation, by normalising casual 
employment and the ‘precarity’ of labour, and the dissolution of political activism into consumer 
commercialism. As always it is important to maintain critical distance and scepticism in relation to 
the object of study, but to maintain a structural model (of inequality, struggle and antagonism) in the 
face of dynamic disequilibrium (change and growth) is to pre-judge how things will turn out, and to 
deny an open future. 
 
Here then is a fork in the road for cultural studies. It has been well theorised by Mark Gibson, who 
was among the first to see that the ‘career’ of cultural studies had taken it on a journey in which its 
early curiosity about the role of culture in social change had been overtaken by a singular and 
theoretical (rather than plural and historical) concept of power (Gibson 2002; 2007; see also Cultural 
Studies Now 2007). Taking one direction at this fork in the road, and following Stuart Hall, were 
those who tended to reduce emergent phenomena to a structural model of power, and therefore 
culture to a ‘whole way of struggle’ or conflict. This idea displaced culture as a ‘whole way of life’ 
(Raymond Williams’s founding formulation) in which ordinary life is understood as more than an 
effect of power; rather it may be the ground for emergent forms. In the ‘power’ model, and following 
the work of Michel Foucault, power was said to be ‘everywhere,’ which led to a tendency for cultural 
critique to focus on local, micro-analysis of instances of power, and for it to neglect further macro-
scale thought about how the system as a whole may be changing and dynamic, capable of generating 
‘emergent’ as well as ‘dominant’ values. Thus there is a version of cultural studies that finds power 
everywhere, but nowhere does it rethink power. Gibson proposes that the concept be pluralised – to 
‘powers’ of various types – and historicised, so that conjunctural analysis can allow for an ‘open 
future,’ and not an endless repetition of the model.  
 
Taking the other fork in the road have been those for whom culture is equated with creativity. 
Whether user-created content is critiqued as a corporate ruse or celebrated as an opportunity for 
‘digital democracy’ – whether you see a glass half-empty or half-full – the fact remains that the rise of 
self-made media poses important questions for cultural studies. A rethink of the metaphor of 
‘industry’ is in order for a start, to get beyond the populist fixation with evil capitalist moguls like 
Rupert Murdoch and Silvio Berlusconi, and to rethink what is meant by production, labour, and 
consumption in terms of complex networks (including markets). This is also to get back to cultural 
studies’ real interest in all of the agents involved in the system (ordinary life), not just inherited 
corporate structures (media industries). It is time to abandon the assumption that causation and 
communication flow one-way only, and to take seriously the agency of the critical-creative citizen-
consumer within an overall system in which major enterprises are also at work. This multi-sourced 
causation in ‘scale free’ complex systems, where consumers join in to ‘do it with others’ (DIWO), is 
modelled on the ‘hubs’ and ‘nodes’ of network theory and complexity studies (Beinhocker 2006) 
rather than on the structural antagonism of classes. 
 
The place where this rethink seems to have progressed most energetically in recent years is in the 
new field of ‘creative industries’ (Hartley 2005; 2008b). The issues raised in the attempt to identify 
and explain the creative industries are of significance to cultural studies, because the creative 
industries are located at the very place where new values, both economic and cultural, new 
knowledge and new forms of social relationship are emergent (rather than ‘dominant’) and where 
they are in process of society-wide adoption and retention, often through market mechanisms. It may 
even be argued that the ‘creative industries’ are the empirical form taken by innovation in advanced 
knowledge-based economies, in which case their importance – like that of the media – exceeds their 
scale as a ‘sector’ of the economy. It extends to their role as a general enabling social technology. This 
would place creative innovation on a par with other ‘enabling social technologies’ like the law, 
science, and markets. Where the media (in the guise of ‘cultural industries’) were regarded as the 
social technology of ideological control in the modern industrial era, the creative industries may be 
regarded as the social technology of distributed innovation in the era of knowledge-based complex 
systems.  
 
In order to understand the creative industries as a general enabling social technology it is necessary to 
move beyond the ‘industry’ or supply-side model of the publisher/provider, and instead to develop a 
demand-led or ‘navigator/aggregator’ model of creative innovation (see Figs 2.1, 2.2., 2.3; see also Fig 
1). 
[This section is reproduced from Hartley 2008b] 
Fig 2.1: Industrial-era or ‘provider’ model of creative causation 
 
 
Instead of the industrial or modern-era model is now possible to propose a demand model of 
creativity in an evolutionary model of the economy. This sees creative culture in terms of the growth 
of knowledge among the entire population, not merely among industry or artistic experts. Instead of 
being the objects of causal sequence, consumers, users and citizens become its subject, navigating as 
agents, not being pushed around as passive effects, thus:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 2.2: Network-era or ‘demand’ model of creative causation 
 
This model pushes out towards the future, not the past; it is an ‘emergent’ model of innovation. Here 
creativity may be located as part of ‘human capital.’  
 
These provider/demand diagrams are of heuristic value only, of course: in reality the arrows always 
go both ways; like this: 
 
Fig 2.3: Interactive model of knowledge growth 
 
 
Social network markets 
Seen this way, the evolution of the creative industries does allow us to make a significant conceptual 
advance; one based on evolutionary economics (Beinhocker 2006), and taking seriously the dynamics 
of change and innovation, the emergence of order in complex systems, and the possibility that both 
economic and cultural ‘behaviour’ may be explained using game theory and complexity theory. In 
this environment, the object of the exercise is to understand the origination, adoption and retention 
of knowledge, not simply to critique the activities of firms. Indeed, the very term ‘industry’ has been 
part of the problem. A better term than ‘industry’ is ‘market,’ specifically ‘social network markets’ 
(Potts et al 2008). For one thing, it shifts causal sequence from a supply-driven to a demand-driven 
dynamic. A demand-led model of creative citizen-navigators requires a reformulation of the familiar 
‘value chain’ approach to cultural production, which typically follows a one-way logic of causation, 
like this (and compare Fig. 1):  
i. producer (creation) and production (manufacture);  
ii. commodity (e.g. text, IP) and distribution (via media);  
iii. consumer or audience  
 
Instead what is needed is: 
i. agents (origination), who may be individuals or firms, characterised by choice, 
decision-making and learning;  
ii. networks (adoption), both real (social) and virtual (digital); 
iii. enterprise (retention), market-based organisations and coordinating institutions (Potts 
et al 2008). 
And instead of linear causation, what is needed is a dynamic and productive interrelationship among 
agents, networks and enterprise; all are engaged in the mutual enterprise of creating values, both 
symbolic and economic. This is a complex open system in which everyone is an active agent, not a 
closed expert value chain controlled by ‘industry.’ Individuals originate ideas; networks adopt them; 
enterprises retain them. 
 
Towards an open future 
‘The 20th century was the American century; the United States changed the 
world…developing all the major new technologies: telephones, automobiles, television, 
jet aircraft, the internet and so on. We all assume, as Washington undoubtedly assumes, 
that we are still living in the era of American hegemony, though it is already clear that 
China may be an emerging superpower. (William Rees-Mogg [fomer editor of The 
Times] 2005) 
 
Thus for analysts interested in social change the creative industries are a bellwether for the ‘open 
future’ predicted by Richard E Lee. Current directions in the study of the continuing encounters 
among culture, economy and politics do not focus so much on struggle, subject-positioning or 
structure, as on change, disequilibrium, and growth. It does seem to many that the current period is 
one of indeterminacy between two relatively stable ‘long centuries’ – the existing ‘American’ one and 
the coming ‘Chinese’ one (Shenkar 2004; Fishman 2004; Rees-Mogg 2005). Therefore, contemporary 
readers and researchers who are interested in the evolving conceptual framework gathered under the 
rubric of ‘cultural studies’ need to look out for the next stage, when ‘disruptive renewal’ stabilises into 
a new emergent order. At that point we can look forward to a ‘macro’ model of the overall dynamic 
knowledge system, in which cultural, economic and political values can be studied in a unified way. 
If emergent creative innovation is itself an ‘enabling social technology,’ then analysts will need to 
focus on local-global instances of popular creativity, the productivity of consumption, and the 
propagation (especially via the internet and other technologically enabled social networks) of the 
‘means of semiotic production’ across whole populations, coordinated in hybrid ‘social network 
markets’ (Potts et al 2008) that allow commercial and community enterprises, corporate giants and 
micro-businesses, to co-exist and co-create values. In such a context it will be possible to understand 
the uses of creative and cultural resources for enterprise at both community and commercial levels, 
and to extend from ‘defensive’ cultural identity to expansive creative innovation. Cultural studies 
emerges not only as a philosophy of plenty but as a policy and practice too: it is a useful conceptual 
framework for analysing innovation systems, creative industries, and the propagation of creative 
productivity. At that stage, when it is part of a unified study of the growth of knowledge, it may have 
to change its name – to ‘cultural science.’ Certainly it will have to change its centre of gravity – from 
West to East. 
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